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THE NEGLIGENT DOCTOR
BY A. M. LINDEN*
I

Introduction

Tort law seeks to supervise the quality of medical practice. Whether it is
successful or not in its efforts is an unanswered question, 1 but this has not
stopped tort law from trying. Dissatisfied with self-regulation alone, a series of
rather general guidelines have evolved over the years to guide not only doctors
but the members of all other professional groups.
As long ago as 1838 Chief Justice Tindal articulated the principle that
survives to this day:
Every person who enters into a learned profession undertakes to bring to the
exercise of it a reasonable degree of care and skill. He does not undertake, if he is
an attorney, that at all events you shall gain your cause, nor does a surgeon undertake that he will perform a cure; nor does he undertake to use the highest possible
degree of skill. There may be persons who have higher education and greater
advantages than he has, but he undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable, and competent
degree of skill... .2

A similar test has issued from Lord Chief Justice Hewart who once stated
that:
If a person holds himself out as possessing special skill and knowledge .... [he
undertakes] to use diligence, care, knowledge, skill and caution in administering the
treatment . .

competence. 3

.

. The law requires a fair and reasonable standard of care and

In all of these cases, the courts are balancing the interests of the clients
or patients in receiving skilled service as well as the interests of professional
men ina certain degree of autonomy in their dealings with the community. As
always, an uneasy compromise has been reached.
II

The Standardof Care

The standard of care demanded of doctors, like that of lawyers, 4 rests on
a contractual foundation, but "a physician, even a specialist, gives no guarantee
*Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
ID. Kretzmer, The Malpractice Suit: Is It Needed? (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 55; Haines, The Medical Profession and the Adversary Process (1973), 11
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 41.
2
Lamphier v. Philpos (1838), 8 C. & P. 475 at 478.
3
Rex v. Bateman (1925), 41 T.L.R. 557 at 559.
4
Fleming J., Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability (1959), 12
Vand. L. Rev. 633; Haines, Courts and Doctors (1952), 30 Can. Bar Rev. 483; McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Practitioners(1959), 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549; Sherman, The
Standardof Carein MalpracticeCases (1966), 4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 222; Thomson,
"Claims Arising Out of the Relationship Between Doctor and Patient", printed in Special
Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada on Medical Liability (1963) at 185. See
generally, Nathan, Medical Negligence (London: Butterworths, 1957); Meredith,
Malpractice Liability of Doctors and Hospitals (Toronto: Carswell Company, 1956);
Louisell & Williams, Trial of MalpracticeCases (Albany: M. Bender, 1960).
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of success". 5 In undertaking the treatment of a patient, a doctor gives no implied
warranty that he will effect a cure, and, hence, he is not an insurer, unless, of
6
course, there is an express agreement to this effect.
The physician is liable for malpractice if he fails to conduct himself like a
reasonably prudent doctor. This is an objective standard, which takes into
account the extra knowledge possessed by the actor. In Wilson v. Swanson7
Mr. Justice Rand explained that a surgeon undertakes that he "possesses the
skill, knowledge and judgment of the generality or average of the special group
or class of technicians to which he belongs and will faithfully exercise them".
What he must do is engage in an "honest and intelligent exercise of judgment".
If a "substantial opinion" in his profession confirms his judgment, even though
it was wrong, the mishap will be considered only an error of judgment, not
"unskilfullness". 8
Another widely-accepted formulation of the standard demanded of medical
practitioners, which echoes the classic statement of Lord Chief Justice Hewart, 9
was expressed by Mr. Justice Schroeder in Crits v. Sylvester'0 as follows:
Every medical practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and
knowledge and must exercise a reasonable degree of care. He is bound to exercise
that degree of care and skill which could reasonably be expected of a normal,
prudent practitioner of the same experience and standing....

In short, physicians must conform to the "accepted standards of the day"."
III Custom
If a physician's conduct complies with the customary practices of his
profession he is virtually assured of being exonerated when something goes
wrong.12 This 14
defence is not conclusive, 13 however, although it was thought to
time.
one
at
be
Doctors are frequently relieved of liability on the ground that they have
acted in accordance with approved methods. Understandably, evidence of general practice is' accorded more respect in medical matters15 than it receives in
5.Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital, [1971] 2 O.R. 113 at 111 (per Addy J.).
6
Towvn v. Archer (1902), 4 O.L.R. 383 at 388 (per Falconbridge C.J.).
7 [1956] S.C.R. 804 at 811.
Bid., at 812. See also Ostrowski v. Lotto, [1971] 1 O.R. 372 at 382 aff'd 31 D.L.R.
(3d) 715 (S.C.C.).
9
Supra, note 3.
10 [1956] O.R. 133 at 143, aff'd [1956] S.C.R. 991. See also Gent & Gent v. Wilson,
[1956] O.R. 257 at 265 (perSchroeder J.A.).
lOstrowski v. Lotto, [1969] 1 O.R. 341 at 355 (per Keith J.)rev'd on another point,
[1971] 1 O.R. 372 (C.A.), aff'd 31 D.L.R. (3d) 715 (S.C.C.).
12Vancouver General Hospital v. McDaniel, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 593 at 579 (per
Lord Alness).
13Cavanaghv. Ulster Weaving Co., [1960] A.C. 145.
14Vancouver General Hospital v. McDaniel, supra, note 12; Marshall v. Lindsey
County Council, [1935] 1 K.B. 516 at 540 affirmed [1937] A.C. 97.
15
Weiler, Groping Towards a CanadianTort Law: The Role of the Supreme Court of
Canada (1971), U. of T. L.J. at 324 says it is conclusive. See Ostrowski v. Lotto, supra,
note 8 at 382 (per Aylesworth J.A.) quoting Bolam v. Friern Hospital, [1957] 2 All
E.R. 118.
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other types of cases, because there is greater judicial trust in the reasonableness
of the practices of a sister profession than there is in the methods of commercial
men. Further, in the professional cases, the contractual undertaking made is
only to employ customary treatment methods. In an early case, Jewison v.
Hassard,16 a sponge was left behind in a patient after surgery. The action against
the doctor was dismissed on the ground that, since the surgeon was "too busy
with his work to keep count of the sponges", he properly delegated this responsibility to a competent and experienced nurse, which was the usual practice.
Mr. Justice Haggart also concluded that the operation was "performed in
accordance with up-to-date clinical surgery". 17 In McFadyen v. Harvie,18 a
doctor applied a cautery during surgery to an area that had been washed down
with iodine and alcohol, burning the patient. No liability was incurred for,
according to Robertson C.J.O., the doctor had "followed the recognized
practice"' 19 in relying upon his assistants in this regard. Mr. Justice Gillanders
also agreed to absolve the defendant, who had used the "recognized and
approved method". 20 The Supreme Court of Canada, in affirming the Ontario
Court of Appeal, merely asserted that it was in accord with the Chief Justice
of Ontario.
The same principles apply to diagnosis as well as treatment. According
to Mr. Justice Schultz in Penner v. Theobald,21 "it is by the methods and
practices which characterize his school that (a medical man) must be judged
in determining whether or not he was negligent in his diagnosis." Although
the court held the defendant chiropractor liable for his negligent treatment
because "his own testimony was conclusive as to the unwisdom of the practice
he followed", 22 it felt that his diagnosiswas acceptable because it was "thorough
and complete by the standards of that profession". 23 In this decision, Mr. Justice
Schultz recognized the true role of custom in negligence law, when he explained
that:
While it is true that in the great majority of alleged malpractice cases a charge of
negligence can be met by evidence to the effect that what was done was in accordance
with general and approved practice, nevertheless, it is the courts and not the
particular profession concerned which decide whether negligence is established
in a particular case.

24

The practices of the medical profession are, however, not inviolable.
If medical men follow procedures that are shown to be inadequate, the courts
may adjudge them to be negligent. Naturally, before they shatter a medical
custom, the courts will insist upon clear evidence of its impropriety. In Anderson
v. Chasney,25 a sponge was left behind by the defendant during a tonsil and
16(1916), 28 D.L.R. 584 at 585, (per Richards, J.A.) (Man. C.A.). See also Whiteford v.
Hunter, [1950] W.N. 553 (H.L.); Karderasv. Clow, [1973] 1 O.R. 730.
17d., at 587.
18 [1941] 2 D.L.R. 663 (Ont. C.A.) affirmed [1942] 4 D.L.R. 647 (S.C.C.).
19d., at 668 (in C.A.)
20d., at 670 (in C.A.)
21Schultz J.A. in Pennerv. Theobald (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 700 at 708 (Man. C.A.).

221d., at 712.
23Id., at 708.

241d., at 712, citing Anderson v. Chasney.
.25 [1949] 4 D.L.R. 71 (Man. C.A.), affirmed [1950] 4 D.L.R. 223 (S.C.C.).
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adenoid operation. In the Court of Appeal it was contended that one of two
existing security methods, that is, sponge counting or using sponges with tapes,
should have been adopted, although it was not proved that it was customary to
do this. "If a practitioner refuses to take an obvious precaution, he cannot
exonerate himself by showing that others also neglect to take it", asserted
Mr. Justice Coyne in a dictum.26 The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the
result on the ground that a careless search had been conducted. In Crits v.
Sylvester,27 the Ontario Court of Appeal held liable an anaesthetist for an
explosion that occurred during an operation. The decision rested on the finding
that the defendant was not following "his general approved practice in pursuing
the course of action outlined by him", but in a dictum, Mr. Justice Schroeder
stated that, even if he were following the standard practice, "such evidence is not
necessarily to be taken as conclusive on an issue of negligence". 28 Custom,
therefore, is influential, but it does not rule.
If a plaintiff establishes that a doctor failed to conform with the general
practice of his profession, he will probably recover. According to Professor
Fleming, "failure to adopt the general practice is often the strongest possible
indication of want of care". 29 Dean Prosser, too, asserts that "the omission of
a customary precaution may, in a particular case, be negligence in itself,
especially where it is known that others may rely on it".30 Thus, if a doctor
fails to sterilize the needle after each inoculation in accordance with the
accepted procedure, he is liable to any patient infected as a result of this. 31
This is justifiable because evidence of what most of the people in a profession
do is evidence of what is considered reasonable in the circumstances. 32 Moreover, there is no problem of unfeasibility since, if most are already complying
with a custom, it must be practicable for those who are not yet conforming
thereto.
Nevertheless, sub-conformity with usage is not conclusive of negligence.
The Lord President of the Court of Sessions, Lord Clyde, has explained in
Hunter v. Hanley,33 that "a deviation from ordinary professional practice is
not necessarily evidence of negligence". "It would be disastrous if this were so",
he contended, "for all inducement to progress in medical science would then
be destroyed". In other words, experimentation with new methods must be
permitted if tort law is to avoid thwarting the advancement of science. Thus, it
261d., at 85-86. Weiler, supra, note 15, treats this as a case of non-medical judgment,
an exception to a rule of absolute immunity of doctors who conform to custom.
27(1956), 1 D.L.R. (2d) 502.
281d., at 514. See also Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital, [1971] 2 O.R. 112 at 113
(perAddy, J.).
29J. G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed. Sydney: Law Book Co., 1971) at 117.
30W. L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed. St. Paul: West. Pub. Co.,
1971) at 168.
31 Forsbreyv. Bremner (Nov. 24, 1967, Ont. H.C., Brooke J.), unreported on this point.
322 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1940) S. 461; Morris,
42 Colum. LR. 1147 at 1161.
33 [1955] S.C. 200 at 206 (new trial ordered where jury found for defendant after
being told departure from custom was "gross negligence". Two judges relied on the gross
negligence point alone.)
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is only where deviation from a customary norm is shown to be "one which no
professional man of ordinary skill would have taken if he had been acting with
ordinary care", that negligence is established. Nor is the extent of deviation the
test here; it matters not how far or little the defendant departs from the general
practice. What is vital, however, is whether his conduct is negligent. The
Lord President declared that three matters must be proved by the plaintiff: first,
there is a usual and normal practice; second, the defender has not adopted that
practice; third, no professional man34 of ordinary skill would have so acted if he
had been acting with ordinary care.
Lord Clyde's first two requirements are unassailable, but in the third too
heavy a burden is placed on the plaintiff. Evidence of deviation from custom
should be prima facie negligence.35 Once deviation from custom is proved, the
defendant should be expected to explain why he departed from the usual
practice. In any event, one cannot escape the conclusion that failure to take
the precautions ordinarily taken in the circumstances will be most influential
upon the court or jury, even if it is not binding upon them.
IV SpecialistsandNovices
Specialists, as might be expected, must perform at a higher level than
general practitioners. They, after all, represent themselves as possessing superior
skills and additional training. Their fees normally reflect this. Consequently,
according to Mr. Justice Abbott in Wilson v. Swanson,3 6 a specialist must
"exercise the degree of skill of an average specialist in his field". Mr. Justice
Schroeder has also declared that if a doctor "holds himself out as a specialist,
a higher degree of skill is required of him than37 of one who does not profess
to be so qualified by special training and ability".
But even a specialist does not have to achieve perfection. If an operation,
though unsuccessful, is conducted in a way "consistent with good orthopedic
surgical practice", no liability will ensue.38 Similarly, a dermatologist escapes
with generally
responsibility if the procedure he adopts is in "accordance
39
accepted good medical practice in the field of dermatology".
On the other hand, a dermatologist may be liable if he burns a patient
while treating eczema with a dosage that is too high and of too long duration. 40
Similarly, a surgeon, who removed more of a patient's insides than was required41
because he mistakenly believed that there was a malignancy, was exonerated.
341d.
35

Brown v. Rolls Royce, [1960] 1 All E.R. 577, 1 W.L.R. 210.
36 [1956] S.C.R. 804 at 817.
37
Crits v. Sylvester, [1956] O.R. 133 at 143, aff'd [1956] S.C.R. 991; Gent v. Wilson,
[1956] O.R. 257 at 265, (per Schroeder J.A.). In McCaffrey v. Hague, [1949] 2 W.W.R.

539 at 542, Campbell J. said, "A higher degree of skill is required from one who holds
himself out to be a specialist". See also MacDonald v. York County Hospital (1972),

28 D.L.R. (3d) 521 at 533, per Addy, J.; Karderas v. Clow, [1973] 1 O.R. 730 at
738 per Cromarty, J. (Obstetrics and Gynaecology).
38
39

4

Ostrowskiv. Lotto, supra, note 11 at 381 (in C.A.)

Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital,supra,note 5 at 116.

OMcCaffery v. Hague, [1949] 2 W.W.R. 559 (Man. K.B.).
41 Wilson v. Swanson, [1956] S.C.R. 804.
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So too, was a pediatrician absolved when a vaccination he administered spread
infection to other parts of a patient's body. 42
Although it has toughened its general standard for specialists tort law has
not diluted it for inexperienced doctors. Hence, a "novice surgeon", who had
not performed a particular operation before, was made liable when he severed
a nerve. 43 Internes are given no special dispensation if they hold themselves
out to be fully qualified. It is, however, still an open question whether a lower
standard of care would be acceptable if an interne identified himself as such
to the patient. In Vancouver GeneralHospitalv. Fraser,44 two internes, licenced
to practice within the confines of a hospital, wrongly read some X-rays of a
car accident victim that came to their hospital, talked to his family doctor and
then sent him away. The patient later died as a result of complications from a
broken neck, which their examination failed to detect. Their employer, the
hospital, was held vicariously liable for their blunder. Mr. Justice Rand based
his decision on the fact that the internes' conduct was cloaked with "all the
ritual and paraphernalia of medical science". An inteme had to be "more than
a mere untutored communicant between [the family doctor] and the patient". 45
He must exercise the "undertaken degree of skill and that cannot be less than
the ordinary skill of a junior doctor". One of the most vital things he must have
is an "appreciation of his own limitations". By failing to notify a radiologist
that was on call at the hospital and relying on their own imperfect knowledge,
they acted negligently.
V

Locality Rule

It was once thought that a doctor was protected from tort liability if he
merely lived up to the standard of the profession in his own community or similar localities.46 Someone in "country practice" did not have to be as proficient
as an urban physician. 47 This idea still clings to life, but it is dying. In the recent
case of McCormick v. Marcotte,48 a doctor was held liable when he performed
an obsolete type of operation on the patient because he was unable to do the
one recommended to him by a specialist. Mr. Justice Abbott imposed liability,
but formulated the standard of care as if the locality rule still survived. His
Lordship suggested that a doctor was required to "possess that reasonable
degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by practitioners in similar
communities in similar cases". Mr. Justice Abbott, however, quoted from the
trial judge to the effect that this was a "hospital in a well-settled part of the
42

43

Gent & Gent v. Wilson, supra, note 10.

McKeachie v. Alvarez (1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 87 at 100 (per Wilson J.)(B.C.);
see also Challand v. Bell (1959), 1 D.L.R. (2d) 150; Walker v. Bddard, [1945] O.W.N.
120 at 124.
44 [1952] 2 S.C.R. 36.
45 Id., at 46.
46

See Meredith, supra, note 4 at 62; see Abbott, J. in Wilson v. Swanson, supra,.

note 41 at 817; Challandv. Bell, supra,note 43. See generally Waltz, The Rise and Gradual
Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Legislation (1969), 18 De Paul L.
Rev. 408.
4

7Hodgins v. Banting (1906), 12 O.L.R. 117 (Boyd C.)

48(1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 345 (S.C.C., Quebec appeal) at 346.
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province [Quebec] within easy reach of the largest centres of population".
This obiter dictum need not, therefore, prevent the demise of the locality rule.
It would be preferable if the locality rule were abandoned. This would
reflect the improvements in modem communications, medical education and the
uniformity of examinations for doctors in Canada. 49 In the case of Town v.
Archer,50 as long ago as 1902, Chief Justice Falconbridge criticized the "locality
rule" on the ground that "all the men practicing in a given locality might be
equally ignorant and behind the times, and regard must be had to the present
advanced state of the profession and to the easy means of communication with,
and access to, the large centres of education and science.. ." In Town v. Archer
the community in question was Port Perry, which at that time was only two
hours from Toronto, then a city of a quarter of a million people, with three
medical colleges and numerous hospitals. Communications and access to
information has improved greatly since then, so that there is even less reason
to differentiate between localities. Moreover, a principle that permits an inferior
brand of medicine for rural Canadians cannot be countenanced. A single
standard for all Canadian doctors might encourage an upgrading of the quality
of medical practice across the country.
In practice, however, one cannot expect all the sophisticated equipment
of a large city hospital to be available in every hospital throughout Canada. 51
Nor can anyone expect the same speed in providing care by a doctor if he has
to travel longer distances. 52
The nature of the difficulty has been outlined in Zinkler v. Robertson:
It surely cannot be that the skill of a physician attending a patient in a private house
[in a rural area] with few conveniences and no assistants, is to be measured by the
same standard as the city surgeon,
provided with an operation room, nurses and
all the aids of a modern hospital. 53

But this does not mean that there must be a varing standard of care depending on the location of the treatment. The same disadvantageous conditions exist
when a doctor is forced to minister to a patient in a private home in Winnipeg
or at the roadside on the Don Valley Parkway in the heart of Toronto. The
difference is not in the standardof care demanded of the physician, but in his
limited access to facilities and equipment. One cannot expect as good results
from treatment in primitive conditions as one can under the best of circumstances. The rural-urban distinction retains significance in this regard, but it
should not be allowed to create a double standard for Canadian doctors based
on geography.
VI The Need to Seek Specialist'sAdvice
A general practitioner should enlist the help of a specialist, if a reasonably
prudent physician would consider it necessary in the circumstances. For
example, a physician must call in a radiologist to read x-rays if he is not capable
49

Uniform exams called "Dominion Councils" are set nationally each year under

the Canadian Medical Act, see Sherman, supra, note 4 at 226.

50(1902), 4 O.L.R. 383 at 388. See also Van Wyk v. Lewis (1924), App. Div. (S. Af.)

438.
51See Whiteford v. Hunter (1950), 94 Sol. J. 758.
52

See Rickley v. Stratton (1912), 22 O.W.R. 282.

53(1897), 30 N.S.R. 61 at 70.
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of doing so himself.5 4 A general practitioner need not, however, exhibit the
expertise of a radiologist.55 In one early case, Jarvis v. International Nickel
Ltd.,5 6 a company doctor in the mining town of Copper Cliff, Ontario, failed to
call in a specialist, despite the urgings of his patient, because he felt it premature.
As a result he failed to diagnose a mastoiditis condition in the ear. Mr. Justice
Wright observed that "most medical men would have" called in a specialist
and that to do so would have been a "more prudent course". 5 7 Nevertheless,
he dismissed the action since he could not find any authority imposing a legal
obligation to seek the advice of a specialist. On the facts, however, it was
probably not negligent to refuse to call a specialist in the circumstances, and,
in any event, there was a lack of evidence of causal connection in the case.
There is another case, Kunitz v. Merei5 8 where blindness resulted from a
haemorrhage which followed an operation to remove some polyps from a
patient's nose. It was alleged that, if an ophthamologist had been consulted
earlier, the blindness might have been avoided. In the circumstances, however,
it was held that there was no negligence and, in any event, it was unlikely that
an earlier consultation would have averted the danger.5 9 Because specialists
are more numerous these days, general practitioners tend to rely upon them
more than ever. Liability should follow if a doctor fails to call in a specialist,
when a prudent practitioner would deem it advisable.6
VII Negligence or Errorof Judgment
The burden of proof rests on the patient to establish substandard conduct
that amounts to negligence. 61 He must overcome a presumption that a licensed
and qualified physician is competent and that his treatment is correct.62 . Malpractice liability is, consequently, rarely found. Claimants have been successful,
however, when someone was burned during a dermatology treatment,63 when
an explosion occurred during the administration of an anaesthetic," and when
a sponge was left behind in the patient during a tonsilectomy.65 Similarly, if a
gauze swab chokes someone during dental surgery, 66 if someone's knee cap
is broken during exercise treatment, 67 and if the wrong organ is removed, 68
54 Vancouver GeneralHospitalv. Fraser,supra, note 44.
55Abel v. Cooke, [1938] D.L.R. 170.

56(1928-29), 63 O.L.R. 564.
57 Id., at 570-7 1.
58 [1969] 2 O.R. 572 (Stark J.)
591d., at 578.
6OMcCoid,supra, note 4 at 567-68.
61 Walker v. Bddard, [1945] O.W.N. 120 at 122.
621d., at 124.
63McCafferey v. Hague, [1949] 2 W.W.R. 539. See also McFadyen v. Harvie, [1941]
O.R. 90.
64 Critsv. Sylvester, supra,note 37.
65Chasney v. Anderson, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 71 (S.C.C.). See also Gloning v. Miller
(1953), 10 W.W.R. 414 (forceps); cf. Jewison v. Hassard(1916), 26 Man. R. 571 (sponge);
Mahon v. Osborne, [ 1939] 1 All E.R. 535; Karderasv. Clow, supra, note 37.
66
Holt v. Nesbitt, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 478 (Ont. C.A.).
67 GuarantyTrust Co. v. Mall Medicare Group, [1969] S.C.R. 541.
68
McNamara v. Smith, [1934] O.R. 249, no liability because no damage suffered
by erroneous removal of uvula.
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negligence may be found. Liability has also been visited on doctors for misuse
of a cautery, 69 for bungling an anaesthetic 70 and for other negligent forms of
71
treatment.
A mere error of judgment does not yield tort damages. No liability has
been imposed where a patient died of shock as a result of a nupercaine anaesthetic injection, 72 where someone's leg ended up shorter as a result of an
operation, 73 where some organs were removed in error,74 and where a vaccination went wrong.75 In Clark v. Wansborough76 a doctor was sued for failing to
discover a dislocated shoulder, after a fractured arm had been x-rayed and
treated. No liability was imposed since such a condition was "almost an unheard
of thing, it is unique" in that type of fracture. The court indicated that an x-ray
examination must always be a question of circumstances depending on the
condition of the patient, the character of the injury and the availability of the
apparatus. 77 Doctors have also been exonerated when a patient leaped out of
a hospital window, 78 when deafness resulted from the use of a drug, 79 and when
a skin treatment caused more pain than usual.8 0
The guidelines laid down by negligence law are sensible; they offer
considerable protection to patients without threatening the ordinarily capable
physician. Our doctors are aware of the general standard whereby their acts
are evaluated 8l and seem willing to abide by it. Unless a convincing case is
made out for its abolition, and until a superior replacement is discovered, the
medical malpractice suit should be allowed to survive.
69
Crysler v. Pearse, [1943] O.R. 735, excess of alcohol in high frequency diathermy
caused fumes to ignite and burn patient; Gray v. LaFl~che (1949), 57 Man. R. 397, misuse
of cautery during circumcision causing serious injury.
7
OJones v. Manchester Corp., [1952] 2 All E.R. 125 (C.A.), pentathol administered
too quickly. Cf. Hughston v. Jost, [1943] O.W.N. 3 (abcess formed).
71Marshallv. Rogers (1943), 2 W.W.R. 545 (B.C.C.A.), diabetic not watched properly
during dangerous treatment; MacDonald v. York County General Hospital (1972),
28 D.L.R. (3d) 521, negligent care of cast; Badger v. Surkan (1971), 16 D.L.R. (3d) 146
(Sask. Q.B.), negligent post operative treatment; Crichton v. Hastings, [1972] 3 O.R. 859,

failure to inform patient about side-effects of anti-coagulant drug; c.f., Bolan v. Friern

Hospital, [1957] 2 All E.R. 118, electro-convulsive therapy caused broken bones, but
case dismissed.
72
Walker v. B6dard, [1945] O.W.N. 120.
73Hodgins v. Banting (1906), 12 O.L.R. 117; Ostrowski v. Lotto, supra, note 11,
aff'd S.C.C. See also Town v. Archer,supra, note 5.
74
Wilson v. Swanson, supra,note 36.
75
Gent & Gent v. Wilson, [1956] O.R. 257. See also Ostash v. Sonnenberg (1968),
67 D.L.R. (2d) 311 (Alta. C.A.), no liability for failure to detectcarbon monoxide poisoning.
76 [1940] O.W.N. 67 at 70.
77
See also Moore v. Large (1932), 46 B.C.R. 179, Sabapathi v. Huntley, [1938]
1 W.W.R. 817.
7

8
University Hospital Board v. Lepine, [1966] S.C.R. 561. See also Child v.
Vancouver General Hospital (1970), 71 W.W.R. 656 (S.C.C.), nurse and hospital not

liable when patient fell out of hospital window.
79
8

Male v. Hopmans, [1967] 2 O.R. 457.
OJohnstonv. Wellesley Hospital,supra,note 5.

8196 per cent identified correctly the standard expected of them in a recent survey
done by Professor R. J. Gray and Gilbert Sharpe at the Osgoode Hall Law School.

